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We explore the dynamic effects of news about a future technology improvement which 
turns out ex post to be overoptimistic. We find that it is difficult to generate a boom-bust 
cycle (a period in which stock prices, consumption, investment and employment all rise 
and then crash) in response to such a news shock, in a standard real business cycle model. 
However, a monetized version of the model which stresses sticky wages and a Taylor- 
rule based monetary policy naturally generates a welfare-reducing boom-bust cycle in 
response to a news shock. We explore the possibility that integrating credit growth into 
monetary policy may result in improved performance. We discuss the robustness of our 
analysis to alternative specifications of the labor market, in which wage-setting frictions 
do not distort on going firm/worker relations. 
 
Keywords: DSGE Models, Monetary Policy, Asset price boom-busts.  
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Non-Technical Summary
Sustained and accelerating trends in asset prices have always been a matter of central 
concern for economic policies. What is most worrying in many episodes of asset price 
run-ups, as they unfold, is the possibility that they might come to a sudden stop followed 
by a crashing reversal. Economic history tells many such stories of asset price booms 
followed by resounding busts.
What are the basic forces driving these boom-bust episodes? Are they driven by 
economic fundamentals, or are they “bubbles”? The boom phase is generally associated 
with strong output, employment, consumption and investment, while there is substantial 
economic weakness in the bust phase. Does this association reflect causality going from 
volatility in the stock market to the real economy, or does causality go the other way? Or, 
is it that both are the outcome of some other factor, perhaps the nature of monetary 
policy? 
To answer some of these questions, we study models that have been useful in the analysis 
of US and Euro Area business cycles and we apply a simple idea. The idea is that the 
boom phase is triggered by a signal which leads agents to rationally expect an 
improvement in technology in the future. Although the signal agents receive is 
informative, it is not perfectly accurate. Occasionally, the signal turns out to be false and 
the bust phase of the cycle begins when agents finally realise the actual state of 
technology. While the trigger of the boom-bust cycle in our analysis is in some ways 
simplistic, it has the advantage of allowing us to highlight a result that we think is likely 
to survive in more realistic settings.  
We find that – within the confines of a set of models that fit the data well – it is hard to 
account for a boom-bust episode (an episode in which consumption, investment, output, 
employment and the stock market all rise sharply and then crash) without introducing 
nominal frictions. When we introduce sticky nominal wages and a central bank blindly 
wedded to a conventional Taylor rule, a theory of boom-busts emerges naturally. In our 
environment, this combination suboptimally converts what would otherwise be a mild 
economic fluctuation into a major boom-bust episode.  6
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The logic is simple. In our model, when agents receive a signal of improved future 
technology it is efficient for investment, consumption and employment to all rise on 
impact, and then fall when expectations are disappointed. In the efficient allocations, the 
size of the boom is sharply limited by the rise in the real wage that occurs as the shadow 
cost of labour increases with higher work effort. When there are frictions in setting 
nominal wages, however, a rise in the real wage requires that inflation be allowed to drift 
down. However, in the model, under the standard Taylor rule, the central bank resists the 
tendency of inflation to decelerate by cutting the interest rate. In our exercise, this cut in 
the interest rate fuels the asset price boom and makes the economic expansion – and the 
subsequent fall-off – much larger than is socially optimal.  
In our model, asset price booms are correlated with strong credit growth. We show that a 
modification of the Taylor rule in the direction of having policy ‘lean against the wind’ – 
by tightening when credit growth is strong – would raise welfare by reducing the 
magnitude of the boom-bust cycle. 7
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1. Introduction
In ation has receded from center stage as a major problem, and attention has shifted
to other concerns. One concern that has received increased attention is volatility in
asset markets. A look at the data reveals the reason. Figure 1 displays monthly
observations on the S&P500 (converted into real terms using the CPI) for the period
1870 to early 2006. Note the recent dramatic boom and bust. Two other pronounced
“boom-bust” episodes are evident: the one that begins in the early 1920s and busts
near the start of the Great Depression, and another one that begins in the mid
1950s and busts in the 1970s. These observations raise several questions. What are
the basic forces driving the boom-bust episodes? Are they driven by economic fun-
damentals, or are they bubbles? The boom phase is associated with strong output,
employment, consumption and investment, while there is substantial economic weak-
ness (in one case, the biggest recorded recession in US history) in the bust phase.
Does this association re ect causality going from volatility in the stock market to
the real economy, or does causality go the other way? Or, is it that both are the
outcome of some other factor, perhaps the nature of monetary policy? The analysis
of this paper lends support to the latter hypothesis.
We study models that have been useful in the analysis of US and Euro Area busi-
ness cycles. We adopt the fundamentals perspective on boom-busts suggested by the
work of Beaudry and Portier (2000,2003,2004) and recently extended in the analysis
of Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006). The idea is that the boom phase is triggered by a
signal which leads agents to rationally expect an improvement in technology in the
future. Although the signal agents see is informative, it is not perfect. Occasionally,
the signal turns out to be false and the bust phase of the cycle begins when people
nd this out. As an example, we have in mind the signals that led rms to invest8
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heavily in ber-optic cable, only to be disappointed later by low prots. Another
example is the signals that led Motorola to launch satellites into orbit in the ex-
pectation (later disappointed) that the satellites would be protable as cell phone
usage expanded. Although our analysis is based on rational expectations, we suspect
that the same basic results would go through under other theories of how agents can
become optimistic in ways that turn out ex post to be exaggerated.
Our notion of what triggers a boom-bust cycle is very stylized: the signal occurs
on a particular date and people learn that it is exactly false on another particular
date. In more realistic scenarios, people form expectations based on an accumulation
of various signals. If people’s expectations are in fact overoptimistic, they come to
this realization only slowly and over time. Although the trigger of the boom-bust
cycle in our analysis is in some ways simplistic, it has the advantage of allowing us
to highlight a result that we think is likely to survive in more realistic settings.
Our results are as follows. We nd that - within the conn e so fas e to fm o d e l s
that t the data well - it is hard to account for a boom-bust episode (an episode in
which consumption, investment, output, employment and the stock market all rise
sharply and then crash) without introducing nominal frictions. However, when we
introduce an in ation targeting central bank and sticky nominal wages, a theory of
boom-busts emerges naturally. In our environment, in ation targeting suboptimally
converts what would otherwise be a small economic  uctuation into a major boom-
bust episode. In this sense, our analysis is consistent with the view that boom-bust
episodes are in large part caused by monetary policy.
In our model, we represent monetary policy by an empirically estimated Taylor
rule. Because that rule satises the Taylor principle, we refer to it loosely as an
‘in ation targeting’ rule. In ation targeting has the powerful attraction of anchoring
expectations in New Keynesian models. However, our analysis suggests that there9
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are also costs. The analysis suggests that it is desirable to modify the standard
in ation targeting approach to monetary policy in favor of a policy that does not
promote boom-busts. In our model, boom-bust episodes are correlated with strong
credit growth. So, a policy which not only targets in ation, but also ‘leans against
the wind’ by tightening monetary policy when credit growth is strong would reduce
some of the costs associated with pure in ation targeting.
Our results are based on model simulations, and so the credibility of the ndings
depends on the plausibility of our model. For the purpose of our results here, the two
cornerstones of our model are sticky wages and an estimated Taylor rule. That the
latter is a reasonable way to capture monetary policy has almost become axiomatic.
Sticky wages have also emerged in recent years as a key feature of models that t
the data well (see, for example, the discussion in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(2005).) The view that wage-setting frictions are key to understanding aggregate
 uctuations is also reached by a very dierent type of empirical analysis in Gali,
Gertler and Lopes-Salido (forthcoming).
That sticky wages and in ation targeting are uneasy bedfellows is easy to see.
When wages are sticky, an in ation targeting central bank in eect targets the real
wage. This produces ine!cient outcomes when shocks occur which require an adjust-
ment to the real wage (Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000).) For example, suppose
a shock - a positive oil price shock, say - occurs which reduces the value marginal
product of labor. Preventing a large fall in employment under these circumstances
w o u l dr e q u i r ead r o pi nt h er e a lw a g e .W i t hs t i c k yw a g e sa n da ni n  ation-targeting
central bank, the required fall in the real wage would not occur and employment
would be ine!ciently low.
That sticky wages and in ation targeting can cause the economy’s response to
an oil shock to be ine!cient is well known. What is less well known is that the10
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interaction of sticky wages and in ation targeting in the form of a standard Taylor
rule can trigger a boom-bust episode. The logic is simple. In our model, when
agents receive a signal of improved future technology it is e!cient for investment,
consumption and employment to all rise a little, and then fall when expectations
are disappointed. In the e!cient allocations, the size of the boom is sharply limited
by the rise in the real wage that occurs as the shadow cost of labor increases with
higher work eort.1 When there are frictions in setting nominal wages, however, a
r i s ei nt h er e a lw a g er e q u i r e st h a ti n  ation be allowed to drift down. The in ation
targeting central bank, seeing this drift down in in ation, cuts the interest rate to
keep in ation on target. In our model, this cut in the interest rate triggers a credit
boom and makes the economic expansion much bigger than is socially optimal. In a
situation like this, a central bank that ‘leans against the wind’ when credit expands
sharply would raise welfare by reducing the magnitude of the boom-bust cycle.
The notion that in ation targeting increases the likelihood of stock market boom-
bust episodes contradicts conventional wisdom. We take it that the conventional
wisdom is dened by the work of Bernanke and Gertler (2000), who argue that
an in ation-targeting monetary authority automatically stabilizes the stock market.
The reason for this is that in the Bernanke-Gertler environment, in ation tends to
rise in a stock market boom, so that an in ation targeter would raise interest rates,
moderating the rise in stock prices.
So, the behavior of in a t i o ni nt h eb o o mp h a s eo fab o o m - b u s tc y c l ei st h ec r u -
cial factor that distinguishes our story from the conventional wisdom. To assess the
two perspectives, consider Figure 2, which displays in ation and the stock market
in the three major US boom-bust episodes in the 20th century. In each case, in-
1Our denition of the ‘e!cient allocations’ is conventional. They are the allocations that solve
the Ramsey problem.11
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 ation is either falling or at least not rising during the initial phase of the boom.
Additional evidence is presented in Adalid and Detken (2006). They identify asset
price boom/bust episodes in 18 OECD countries since the 1970s. In their Table A1,
they show that in ation is on average weak during the boom-phase of these episodes.
In sum, the proposition that in ation is weak during the boom phase of boom-bust
cycles receives support from US and OECD data.
So far, we have stressed that integrating nominal variables and in ation targeting
into the analysis is merely helpful for understanding boom-bust episodes. In fact, if
one is not to wander too far from current standard models, it is essential.
To clarify this point, it is useful to think of the standard real business cycle model
that emerges when we strip away all monetary factors from our model. If we take a
completely standard version of such a model, a signal shock is completely incapable
of generating a boom-bust that resembles anything like what we see. Households in
eect react to the signal by going on vacation: consumption jumps, work goes down
and investment falls. When households realize the expected shock will not occur
they in eect nd themselves in a situation with a low initial capital stock. The
dynamic response to this is familiar: they increase employment and investment and
reduce consumption. We identify the price of equity in the data with the price of
capital in the model. In the simplest version of the real business cycle model this is
x e db yt e c h n o l o g ya tu n i t y ,s ow eh a v en om o v e m e n t si nt h es t o c kp r i c e s .I ti sh a r d
to imagine a less successful model of a boom-bust cycle!
We then add habit persistence and costs of adjusting the  ow of investment
(these are two features that have been found useful for understanding postwar busi-
ness cycles) and nd that we make substantial progress towards a successful model.
However, this model also has a major failing that initially came to us as a surprise: in
the boom phase of the cycle, stock prices in the model fall and in the bust phase they12
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rise. The reason for this counterfactual implication is simple. Investment expands in
response to the signal about future productivity because agents expect investment to
be high in the future, when technology is high. Under these circumstances, the strat-
egy of cutting investment now and raising it in the future when technology is high
is ine!cient because it entails heavy adjustment costs in the future. In eect, high
expected future investment adds an extra payo to current investment in the form
of reduced future adjustment costs. This corresponds to a reduction in the current
marginal cost of producing capital goods. In a competitive market, this reduction in
marginal cost is passed on to consumers in the form of a lower price.
So, our real business cycle model cannot simultaneously generate a rise in the
price of capital and a rise in investment, in response to a signal about future produc-
tivity. The real business cycle model has two additional shortcomings. It generates
an extremely large jump in the real interest rate and it generates very little per-
sistence. It really only generates a boom-bust pattern in consumption, investment,
employment and output when the signal is about a shock that will occur four quar-
ters in the future. If the signal is about a shock, say, 12 quarters in the future, agents
go on an 8 quarter vacation and then begin working roughly in the 9th quarter. But,
as we see in Figure 1, stock market booms last considerably longer than one year.
So, while a real model takes us part way in understanding a boom-bust cycle, there
are signicant shortcomings.
When we introduce monetary factors and an in ation targeting central bank,
these shortcomings disappear. The monetary expansion produced in the wake of a
signal about higher future productivity generates a boom in the stock price. The
monetary response is associated with very little volatility in the real interest rate, and
the boom bust cycle is highly persistent. In addition, the monetary response greatly
amplies the magnitude of  uctuations in real quantities. Actually the boom-bust13
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produced in the monetary model is so much larger than it is in the real business cycle
model that it is not an exaggeration to say that our boom-bust episode is primarily
a monetary phenomenon.
A feature of the simple monetary model is that wage frictions aect employment
on the intensive margin. As a result, the model is vulnerable to the Barro (1977)
critique. The problem is that in practice, variations on the intensive margin occur
in long-lasting relationships between workers and rms, and such relationships oer
many opportunities to undo the eects of idiosyncrasies in wage setting. To inves-
tigate whether our analysis robust to alternative specications of the labor market
which avoid the Barro critique, we explore a recent proposal of Gertler and Trigari
(2006) and Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2006). In this formulation, wage setting fric-
tions have allocational consequences via their impact on employer eorts to recruit
new workers and they do not distort on-going worker/rm relations. We nd that
with this alternative formulation of the labor market, our analysis goes through qual-
itatively, though the ndings are less dramatic quantitatively. We conjecture that
this does not re ect a weakness in the mechanism outlined in this paper, but instead
re ects that the alternative model requires additional modications to magnify its
monetary non-neutralities.
After analyzing the simple monetary model and its robustness to the Barro cri-
tique, we move on to the full monetary model of Christiano, Motto and Rostagno
(2006). That model incorporates a banking sector and the nancial frictions in
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) into the simple monetary model. The result-
ing model is interesting for two reasons. First, we use the model to investigate the
robustness of our ndings for boom-busts. We feed the model the same signal about
future technology that we fed to our real business cycle and simple monetary mod-
els. We nd that the full and simple monetary models behave quite similarly. The14
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second reason it is interesting to study boom-bust episodes in the Christiano, Motto
and Rostagno (2006) model is that the model has implications for dierent mone-
tary aggregates as well as credit. Discussions of boom-bust cycles often focus on the
behavior of money and credit during a boom. These discussions often emphasize the
importance of distinguishing between money and credit (see, for example, Eichen-
green and Mitchener (2003)). They show, for example, that credit grew very rapidly
during the 1920s, but M2 showed weak and declining growth. Interestingly, when we
feed the signal shock to the model of Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2006) we nd
that credit rises strongly during the boom, though the predictions are ambiguous for
the monetary aggregates, with some showing strength and others weakness. This is
broadly consistent with some existing empirical studies.
Our analysis has more general implications. It is already well known that mone-
tary policy plays an important role in the transmission of fundamental shocks. We
can add that monetary policy is also very important in the transmission of expecta-
tional shocks.
Following is a brief outline of the paper. The next section describes the real
business cycle version of our model in which all monetary factors have been stripped
away. Numerical simulations are used to develop the model’s implications for boom-
bust cycles. Section 3 introduces the smallest number of monetary factors that will
allow the model to successfully generate a boom-bust cycle. In this simple monetary
model, monetary policy is assumed to follow a Taylor rule, which has been estimated
using post war US data. This Taylor rule places positive weight on the output gap
and incorporates ‘interest smoothing’ in that the interest rate is also a function of
the lagged interest rate. The monetary policy rule is an in ation targeting rule in
the sense that the coe!cient on expected in ation satises the ‘Taylor Principle’ in
being larger than unity. In our estimate, it is 1.95. We show that the amplitude of15
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 uctuation of variables in the boom-bust cycle of the simple monetary model is much
greater than it is in the version of the model with optimal monetary policy. This is
the basis for our conclusion that the boom-bust in the monetary model is ine!cient
in a welfare sense. Section 4 investigates robustness to the Barro critique. Section 5
presents the implications for a boom-bust model of the full model monetary model
whose pieces have been studied up to now. The paper closes with a brief conclusion.
Three appendices discuss the technical details of our analysis.
2. Real Business Cycle Model
This section explores the limits of a simple Real Business Cycle explanation of a
boom-bust episode. We show that preferences and investment adjustment costs that
have become standard in successful empirical models of business cycles move us part
way to a full qualitative explanation of a boom-bust episode. However, we are not
successful producing a rise in the price of capital in the boom phase of the cycle. In
addition, we will see that it is hard to generate a boom that is much longer than one
year. Finally, we will see that the model generates extreme  uctuations in the real
rate of interest.
2.1. The Model











Here, kw is hours worked, Fw is consumption and the amount of time that is available
is unity. When eA0 then there is habit persistence in preferences. The resource16
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constraint is
Lw + Fw  \w> (2.1)
where Lw is investment, Fw is consumption and \w is output of goods.





where w represents a stochastic shock to technology and }w follows a deterministic
growth path,
}w = }w31 exp(})= (2.3)
The law of motion of w will be described shortly.
We consider two specications of adjustment costs in investment. According to
one, adjustment costs are in terms of the change in the  ow of investment:












with dA0= We refer to this specication of adjustment costs as the ‘ ow specica-
tion’. In our second model of investment the adjustment costs are in terms of the
level of investment:
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where  is the steady state investment to capital ratio. Here, the parameter, x A 0>
is the elasticity of the investment-capital ratio with respect to Tobin’s t= We refer to
this specication of adjustment costs as the ‘level specication’.
Throughout the analysis, we consider the following impulse. Up until period 1,
the economy is in a steady state. In period w =1 , a signal occurs which suggests
w will be high in period w =1+s= But, when period 1+s occurs, the expected
rise in technology in fact does not happen. A time series representation for w which
captures this possibility is:
logw = logw31 + %w3s + w> (2.7)
where %w and w are uncorrelated over time and with each other. For example, suppose
s =1 = Then, if the realized value of %1 is high value, this shifts up the expected value
of log2.B u t ,i f2 = %1> then the high expected value of log2 does not materialize.
We consider the following parameterization,
 =1 =01358
30=25> } =1 =0136
0=25>e =0 =63>d =1 5 =1> (2.8)
 =0 =40>=0 =025># O =1 0 9 =82> O =1 > =0 =83>s =4 =






=1 2 =59>o=0 =092
We interpret the time unit of the model as being one quarter. This model is a special
case of the model estimated in Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2006) using US data.
In the above list, the parameters d and  were estimated; } was estimated based
on the average growth rate of output;  was selected so that given } the model
matches the average real return on three-month Treasury bills; O was simply set to
produce a Frish labor supply of unity; e was taken from Christiano, Eichenbaum and18
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Evans (2004);  and  were chosen to allow the model to match several ratios (see
Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2006)).
2.2. Results
Consider the line with circles in Figure 3. This line displays the response of the
‘Baseline RBC’ model to a signal in period 1 that technology will jump in period 5
by 1 percent. Then, 5 = 0=01> so that the impact of the signal on w is cancelled
and no change ever happens to actual technology. Note how in the gure output,
investment and hours worked all rise until period 4 and then slowly decline. The
price of capital falls despite the anticipated rise in the payo associated with capital.
This fall is discussed in further detail below, although perhaps it is not surprising
in view of the spike in the interest rate on one period consumption loans taken in
period 4. This jump in the interest rate is extraordinarily large. In the period before
the anticipated jump in technology, the real rate jumps by more than 10 percentage
points, at an annual rate.
The solid line in Figure 3 and the results in Figures 5-8 allow us to diagnose the
economics underlying the line with circles in Figure 3. In Figures 5-8, the circled
line in Figure 3 is reproduced for comparison. The solid line in Figure 3 displays
the response of the variables in the case when the technology shock is realized. This
shows the scenario which agents expect when they see the signal in period 1. Their
response has several interesting features. First, the rise in investment in period 4, the
r s tp e r i o di nw h i c hi n v e s t m e n tc a nb e n e t from the higher expected rate of return,
is not especially larger than the rise in other periods, such as period 5. We suspect
that the failure of investment to rise more in period 4 re ects the consumption
smoothing motive. Period 4 is a period of relatively low productivity, and while19
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high investment then would benet from the high period 5 rate of return, raising
investment in period 4 is costly in terms of consumption. The very high period 4
real interest rate is an indicator of just how costly consumption then is. Second,
hours worked drops sharply in the period when the technology shock is realized. The
drop in employment in our simulation re ects the importance of the wealth eect
on labor. This wealth eect is not felt in periods before 5 because of high interest
rate before then. Commenting on an earlier draft of our work, Jaimovich and Rebelo
(2006) conjecture that this drop is counterfactual, and they propose an alternative
specication of utility in which it does not occur. An alternative possibility is that
the sharp movement in employment re ects the absence of labor market frictions in
our model. For example, we suspect that if we incorporate a simple model of labor
search frictions the drop in employment will be greatly attenuated while the basic
message of the paper will be unaected (see Blanchard and Gali (2006)).
Figure 4 allows us to assess the role of habit persistence in the responses in Figure
3. Three things are worth emphasizing based on this gure. First, Figure 4 shows
that eA0 is a key reason why consumption rises in periods before period 5 in Figure
3. Households, understanding that in period 5 they will want to consume at a high
level, experience a jump in the marginal utility of consumption in earlier periods
because of habit persistence. This can be seen in the expression for the marginal








Second, the early jump in the marginal utility of consumption induced by the pres-
ence of habit persistence also explains why the employment response to the technol-
ogy signal is relatively strong in the presence of habit persistence (the bottom left20
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graph in Figure 4). To see this, consider the intratemporal Euler equation:
w × PSOw = PXOw> (2.10)
where PSOw denotes the marginal product of labor and PXOw denotes the marginal
utility of leisure. From this expression it is clear that with a normal specication of
preferences, it is not possible for both consumption and labor to rise in response to a
future technology shock. The rise in labor would reduce PSOw and increase PXOw>
while the rise in consumption would ordinarily reduce w=2 With habit persistence,
this logic is broken because the anticipated rise in w +1consumption raises w=
Third, note that the employment response without habit persistence, though weak,
is positive. The reason for this is that in the absence of habit persistence, households
nd it optimal to reduce consumption in order to make room for an increase in
investment. The fall in consumption raises w and is the reason why employment
r i s e si nF i g u r e4 ,e v e nw h e ne =0 =
Figure 5 shows what happens when there are no adjustment costs in investment.
In this case, there is no cost to the strategy of simply waiting until later to raise
investment. This strategy has the advantage of permitting consumption smoothing.
One way to see this is to note how the real rate of interest hardly moves when there
are no investment adjustment costs.
Figure 6 shows what happens when we adopt the level specication of adjustment
costs. With this specication, investment falls in response to the signal. This makes
room for additional consumption which reduces w and accounts for the weak response
of employment after the signal (bottom left graph in Figure 6). So, Figure 6 indicates
2This logic was stressed by Barro and King (1984), who argued that it would be di!cult to
square the procylical movement of consumption and labor with the acyclical behavior of wages
under standard preferences.21
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that the  ow specication of adjustment costs in our baseline real business cycle
model plays an important role in producing the responses in Figure 3.
A nal experiment was motivated by the fact that in practice the boom phase
of a boom-bust cycle often lasts considerably more than 4 quarters. To investigate
whether the real business cycle model can generate a longer boom phase, we consid-
ered an example in which there is a period of 3 years from the date of the signal to
the bust. Figure 7 displays simulation results for the case when s =1 2 = Notice that
we have in fact not lengthened the boom phase very much because output, employ-
ment and investment actually only begin to rise about 4 quarters before the bust.
In addition, the model no longer generates a rise in consumption in response to the
signal. According to the gure, consumption falls (after a very brief rise) in the rst
9 quarters. Evidently, households follow a strategy similar to the one in Figure 4,
when there is no habit. There, consumption falls in order to increase the resources
available for investment. Households with habit persistence do not mind following a
similar strategy as long as they can do so over a long enough period of time. With
time, habit stocks fall, thus mitigating the pain of reducing consumption.
2.3. The Price of Capital
To understand the response of the price of capital to a signal about future produc-
tivity, we study two model equations that characterize the dynamics of Sn0>w.O n e
equation is the present discounted value of future payos from capital. This is de-
rived by focusing on the demand for capital. The other implication  ows from the
fact that capital is produced in the model, and corresponds to what is sometimes
referred to as the model’s Tobin’s t relation.
Let w denote the multiplier on (2.4) and w the multiplier on the resource con-22
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straint in the Lagrangian representation of the planning problem. The rst order
conditions for consumption and labor are (2.9) and (2.10), respectively. The rst





13 + w+1 (1  )
¤
=
Note that the object on the right side of the equality is the marginal utility of an
extra unit of Nw+1= It is tomorrow’s marginal physical product of capital, converted
to marginal utility terms by multiplying by w+1 plus the value of the undepreciated
part of Nw+1 that is left over for use in subsequent periods, which is converted into
marginal utility terms by w+1= Divide both sides of the rst order condition for Nw+1















Now, recall that w is the marginal utility of Nw+1> loosely, gX@gNw+1= Similarly, w is
the marginal utility of Fw,l o o s e l ygX@gFw= Thus, the ratio is the consumption cost
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Focusing on the eect of the signal on future un
w’s creates the expectation that Sn0>w
should jump in response to a signal about future productivity. However, we saw in
Figure 3 that the real interest rate jumps in response to such a signal, and this drives
Sn0>w in the other direction. Since this expression highlights two con icting forces on
Sn0>w> it is not particularly useful for understanding why it is that the force driving
Sn0>w down dominates in our simulations.
We obtain the model’s Tobin’s t relation by working the rst order condition for
investment:



















































The right side of the above expression is the marginal cost of an extra unit of capital.
This marginal cost is the sum of two pieces. We see the rst by ignoring the expression
after the minus sign in the numerator. The resulting expression for SN0>w is the usual
marginal cost term that occurs with level adjustment costs. It is the ratio of the
consumption cost of a unit of investment goods, gFw@gLw (which is unity), divided by
the marginal productivity (in producing new capital) of an extra investment good,
gNw+1@gLw. To see that this is indeed the marginal cost of producing new capital,
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i.e., the consumption cost of capital. If we just focus on this part of (2.12), the
puzzle about why SN0>w drops during a boom only deepens. This is because, with
t h eg r o w t hr a t eo fi n v e s t m e n th i g h( s e eF i g u r e3 ,w h i c hs h o w st h a tLw@Lw31 is high
for several periods), the rst term after the equality should unambiguously be high
during the boom. Both V and V0 rise, and this by itself makes SN0>w rise.
Now consider the other term in the numerator of (2.12). The term in square
brackets unambiguously rises after a positive signal about future technology because
future growth in investment increases both V and V0= The square bracketed term
c o n t r i b u t e st oaf a l li nSN0>w. The intuition for this is straightforward. In the wake
of a positive signal about productivity, producers of new capital understand that
investment will be high in the future. When there are adjustment costs, this means
that there is an extra benet to investing today: the reduction of adjustment costs
when investment is made high in the future. In a competitive market, suppliers
of capital will respond to this by bidding down the price of capital. That is what
happens in the equilibrium of our real business cycle model.
It is similar for the central planner, who understands that a signal about posi-
tive future technology implies that building more capital today generates a future
‘kickback’, in the form of reduced adjustment costs in the future. This kickback is
properly thought of as a reduction to the marginal cost of producing current capital,
and is fundamentally the reason the planner is motivated to increase current invest-
ment. This reasoning suggests to us that there will not be a simple perturbation
o ft h er e a lb u s i n e s sc y c l em o d e lw h i c hw i l lg e n e r a t ear i s ei ni n v e s t m e n ta n dar i s e
in the price of capital after a signal about future technology. This motivates us to
consider the monetary version of the model in the next subsection.25
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3. Introducing Nominal Features and an In ation-Targeting
Central Bank
We now modify our model to introduce monetary policy and wage/price frictions.
In the rst subsection below, we present the model. In the second subsection we
present our numerical results.
3.1. Simple Monetary Model
To accommodate price-setting, we adopt the usual assumption that a representative









> 1  i ? 4> (3.1)












> 0 ??1> (3.2)
where x}w is a xed cost and Nmw and kmw denote the services of capital and homoge-
neous labor. Capital and labor services are hired in competitive markets at nominal
prices, Swun
w> and Zw> respectively.
In (3.2), the shock to technology, w> has the time series representation in (2.7). We
adopt a variant of Calvo sticky prices. In each period, w> a fraction of intermediate-
goods rms, 1  s> can reoptimize their price. If the lwk rm in period w cannot
reoptimize, then it sets price according to:
Slw =˜ wSl>w31>26
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where




Here, w denotes the gross rate of in ation, w = Sw@Sw31> and ¯  denotes steady state







¢m w+m [Sl>w+m\l>w+m  Sw+mvw+m (\l>w+m + x}w+m)]= (3.4)
Here, w+m is the multiplier on rm prots in the household’s budget constraint. Also,
Sl>w+m>mA0 denotes the price of a rm that sets Sl>w = ˜ Sw and does not reoptimize
between w+1>===>w+m= The equilibrium conditions associated with rms are displayed
in the appendix.
In this environment, rms set prices as an increasing function of marginal cost.
A rm that has an opportunity to set price will take into account future marginal
costs because of the possibility that they may not be able to reoptimize again soon.
We model the labor market in the way suggested by Erceg, Henderson and Levin
(2000). The homogeneous labor employed by rms in (3.2) is produced from special-








> 1  z= (3.5)
We suppose that this technology is operated by perfectly competitive labor contrac-
tors, who hire specialized labor from households at wage, Zmw> and sell homogenous
labor services to the intermediate good rms at wage, Zw. Optimization by labor







kw> 1  z= (3.6)27
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subject to the constraint








w)Ww + Dm>w> (3.8)
where Pg
w denotes the household’s beginning-of-period stock of money and Ww denotes
nominal bonds issued in period w1> w h i c he a r ni n t e r e s t ,Uh
w> in period w= This nominal
interest rate is known at w  1= In the interest of simplifying, we suppose that   in
(3.7) is positive, but so small that the distortions to consumption, labor and capital
rst order conditions introduced by money can be ignored. Later, we will consider a
model in which   is chosen to match money velocity data. The mwk household is the
monopoly supplier of dierentiated labor, om>w= G i v e nt h el a b o rd e m a n dc u r v e ,( 3 . 6 ) ,
and absent any price frictions, the household would set its wage rate, Zmw> as a xed












where w denotes the marginal utility of consumption, den e di n( 2 . 9 ) . I nf a c t ,
the household is subject to the same Calvo frictions faced by intermediate good
producers in setting their prices. In particular, in any given period the mwk household
can reoptimize its wage rate with probability, 1  z= With probability z it cannot
reoptimize, in which case it sets its wage rate as follows:
Zm>w =˜ z>w}Zm>w31>
where
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In (3.8), the variable, Dm>w denotes the net payo from insurance contracts on the
risk that a household cannot reoptimize its wage rate, Z
m
w = The existence of these
insurance contracts have the consequence that in equilibrium all households have
the same level of consumption, capital and money holdings. We have imposed this
equilibrium outcome on the notation by dropping the m subscript.
The household’s problem is to maximize (3.7) subject to the demand for labor,
(3.6), the Calvo wage-setting frictions, and (2.4). Households set their wage as an
increasing function of the marginal cost of working. The presence of wage frictions
leads households who have the opportunity to reoptimize their wage, to take into
account future expected marginal costs. The sluggishness of wages and the fact that
households are required to satisfy (3.6) implies that in the short run, employment is
largely demand-determined.
The monetary authority controls the supply of money, Pv
w = It does so to imple-
















w is aggregate output on a nonstochastic steady state growth path and xw
is an iid monetary policy shock. The monetary authority manipulates the money
supply to ensure that the equilibrium nominal rate of interest, Uw> satises:
Uw = lUw31 +( 1 l)U
W
w= (3.11)
The parameter values for the model are the ones in the real business cycle model,
plus the following:
i =1 =20> z =1 =05> s =0 =63> z =0 =81> =0 =84> (3.12)
z =0 =13> l =0 =81>  =1 =95> | =0 =18> =0 =29
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Our monetary model is a special case of a more general model which was estimated in
US data in Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2006). All but the rst two parameters
above were estimated there.
3.2. Results
Figure 8 displays the results of the response to a signal in period 1 about a shock in
period 13 (indicated by the ‘*’), which ultimately does not occur. The results for the
real business cycle model in Figure 7 are reproduced here to facilitate comparison.
Both models have costs in adjusting the  ow of investment, as well as habit persis-
tence in consumption. Still, the two models display strikingly dierent responses to
the signal shock in period 1. First, the magnitude of the responses in output, hours,
consumption and investment in the monetary model are more than three times what
they are in the real business cycle model. Second, consumption booms in the imme-
diate period after the signal. Third, the risk free rate moves by only a small amount,
and it falls rather than rising as in the real business cycle model. Fourth, although
in ation initially rises, eventually it falls by 0.8 of one percent. Fifth, and perhaps
most signicantly, the stock price rises.
The simple monetary model behaves so dierently from the real business cycle
model because the monetary policy rule, (3.11), is suboptimal for our model economy.
With optimal monetary policy, the response of the allocations in the simple monetary
model would have been virtually the same as the responses in the real business cycle
model. In particular, there would have been a boom, but only a very small one. To
understand how we reached this conclusion, consider the starred lines in Figure 9 (the
solid lines reproduce the solid lines in Figure 8 for convenience). The starred lines
were obtained by rst deleting the monetary policy rule, (3.11), from the simple30
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monetary model. Of course, this renders the model unable to determine values
for the endogenous variables. In eect, there are now many congurations of the
endogenous variables which satisfy the remaining equilibrium conditions (i.e., the
resource constraint, the necessary conditions associated with optimality, etc.) From
this set of possible equilibria, we selected the Ramsey equilibrium, the one associated
with the highest level of expected household utility. The allocations in this Ramsey
equilibrium are what is achieved with the best possible monetary policy, when we
do not place any constraints on what form monetary policy takes on.3 Note how the
Ramsey equilibrium responses of output, investment, consumption, hours worked,
the real interest rate, and the price of capital virtually coincide with what they are
in the real business cycle. That is, had monetary policy in the simple monetary
model been optimal, the allocations would have been essentially the same as those
in the RBC model.4
W h a ti si ta b o u t( 3 . 1 1 )t h a tc a u s e si tt r a n s f o r mw h a tw o u l dh a v eb e e nam i n o r
 uctuation into a substantial, welfare-reducing, boom-bust cycle? A clue lies in the
fact that the real wage rises during the boom under the optimal policy, while it
falls under (3.11). During the boom of the simple monetary model, employment is
ine!ciently high. This equilibrium outcome is made possible in part by the low real
wage (which signals employers that the marginal cost of labor is low) and the fact that
3Technical details on the computation of optimal monetary policy are provided in Appendix B.
4The reasons the allocations in the RBC model and in the Ramsey equilibrium do not coincide
exactly is that there are too many frictions for monetary policy to undo. Monetary policy is only
one instrument, but there are several frictions, including sticky prices and sticky wages. Other
frictions include the distortions induced by the presence of market power in rms and households.
If these frictions were small (or, undone by a suitable choice of taxes) then if there were either
only sticky prices or only sticky wages, the Ramsey equilibrium allocations would coincide with the
allocations in the RBC model.31
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employment is demand-determined. The high real wage in the Ramsey equilibrium,
by contrast, sends the right signal to employers and discourages employment. Since
wages are relatively sticky compared to prices, an e!cient way to achieve a higher
real wage is to let in ation drop. But, the monetary authority who follows the
in ation-targeting strategy, (3.11), is reluctant to allow this to happen. Such a
monetary authority responds to in ation weakness by shifting to a looser monetary
policy stance. This, in our model, is the reason the boom-bust cycle is amplied.
Thus, the suboptimally large boom-bust cycle in the model is the outcome of the
interaction between sticky wages and the in ation targeting monetary policy rule,
(3.11).
To gain further intuition into the boom-bust cycle in the simple monetary model,
consider Figure 11 (there is no Figure 10 in the paper). Figure 11 shows what would
have happened if the rise in productivity that is signalled is actually realized. In
eect, the gure shows what expectations agents have as they respond to the signal
about future productivity. Note that they expect a much bigger and more persistent
decline in the nominal interest rate than actually occurs in the equilibrium in Figure
8. Note too, that there is a sharp drop in employment when the technology shock is
realized, as in the real business cycle model. This is similar to what we saw in the
real business cycle analysis in Figure 3.
Figures 12 and 13 explore the role of sticky prices and wages in our analysis,
respectively, by repeating our experiment twice. In the rst case, s =0 =01 and all
other parameters are held xed at their baseline levels. In Figure 13, z =0 =01 and all
other parameters are held constant at their baseline values. The experiments convey
a strong message: sticky wages are crucial to our result, not sticky prices. When
wages are  exible, the boom-bust in the simple monetary model closely resembles
what it is in the real business cycle model. We veried that this result is not an32
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artifact of the fact that s is smaller than z in our baseline parameterization. For
example, when we set s =0 =95 and z =0 =01, the results for quantities are similar
to what we see in Figure 13.
In Figures 14 and 15 we attempt to investigate the specicr o l ep l a y e db yp o l i c yi n
generating the boom-bust cycle. Figure 14 reports what happens when the monetary
policy rule focuses less on in ation, by setting  =1 =05= The real quantities now
 uctuate much as they do in the real business cycle model. This is consistent with
our general theme, that in ation targeting is at the heart of why we get a boom-bust
in our model.
Figure 15 displays a dierent way of assessing the role of monetary policy in our
equilibrium. This experiment focuses specically on the impact of the sharp drop
in the interest rate that agents expect according to the solid line in Figure 11. For
this experiment, we add an iid monetary policy shock to the policy rule, (3.11). We
suppose that the shock has the same time series representation as (2.7), except  =0 =
We set s =1 0 > and considered a signal which creates the expectation that there will
be a 100 basis point negative shock to the quarterly rate of interest in period 11. We
imposed that that shock is in fact not realized. The idea is to create a policy-induced
move in the actual interest rate, together with a prior expectation that the rate would
fall even more. Figure 15 indicates that this anticipated monetary loosening creates
a substantial boom right away in the model. The boom accounts for almost all of
the monetary part of the boom-bust in the simple monetary model. The vertical
dierence between the two lines in Figure 15 is roughly the size of the boom in
the real business cycle model. The results in Figure 15 suggests the following loose
characterization of our boom-bust result in the simple monetary model: one-third
of the boom-bust cycle is the e!cient response to a signal about technology, and
two-thirds of the boom-bust cycle is the ine!cient consequence of suboptimality in33
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the monetary policy rule. This suboptimality operates by creating an expectation of
a substantial future anticipated loosening in monetary policy.
In sum, analysis with the simple monetary model suggests that successfully gener-
ating a substantial boom-bust episode requires a monetary policy rule which assigns
substantial weight to in ation and which incorporates sticky wages.
4. Robustness to an Alternative Specication of the Labor
Market
The boom phase of our analysis is characterized by a low real wage, which encourages
rms to expand employment, while workers are required to supply whatever labor is
demanded at the given wage. It is unclear exactly how one should map this labor
market specication into actual labor market arrangements, where workers spend
a substantial fraction of the time in repeated relationships with rms. Still, the
setup is vulnerable to the Barro (1977) critique. Because labor eort in the model is
varied on the intensive margin, it is tempting to interpret the model as a metaphor
for actual rm-worker relationships. But, as Barro emphasized, the notion that
idiosyncrasies in the setting of wages should have allocational consequences for rms
and workers in long-lasting relationships seems implausible. There are simply too
many opportunities for people in long-lasting relationships to undo the eects of
wage frictions.5
In recent years an alternative approach to labor markets has emerged, starting
with the work of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and, more recently, Hall (2005a,b,c)
and Shimer (2005a,b). Gertler and Trigari (2006) build on this work (particularly,
the insight in Hall (2005a)) to show how the wage setting frictions that have proved so
5This point was stressed more recently by Goodfriend and King (1997).34
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useful in tting models to macroeconomic data may be recast so as to avoid running
afoul of the Barro critique. We follow Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2006) (GST) in
incorporating a version of the Gertler and Trigari (2006) (GT) labor market model
into the monetary model of the previous section. In GST, wage setting frictions have
no impact on on-going worker employer relations because (i) they have no direct
impact on the intensive labor margin, and (ii) they do not induce worker-employer
separations since, by assumption, these occur only in response to exogenous events.6
Wage setting frictions do have allocational eects in the GT and GST models, but
these eects operate by their impact on rms’ incentives to recruit new workers.
The basic logic stressed throughout this paper, that wage-setting frictions and
in ation targeting can trigger boom-busts, also goes through in this alternative for-
mulation of the labor market. The low real wage in the boom phase generates an
excess of economic activity because the low real wage causes too many resources to
be allocated to recruiting workers.
4.1. The Model
The labor market in our alternative labor market model is a slightly modied version
of the GST model. GST assume wage-setting frictions of the Calvo type, while we
instead work with Taylor-type frictions.7 In addition, we adopt a slightly dierent
representation of the production sector in order to maximize comparability with the
6The specication that the job separation rate is constant and the nding rate endogenous is
consistent with ndings reported in Hall (2005b,c) and Shimer (2005a,b ), who report that the job
nding rate is very cyclical and the job separation rate is substantially less so.
7We work with Taylor frictions because we want to be in a position to check the accuracy of our
linear approximations by comparing them with higher-order approximations. It is our impression
that the linearization strategy adopted by GST for their Calvo-specication of wage frictions does
not easily generalize to higher orders.35
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model used elsewhere in the paper. In what follows, we rst provide an overview and
after that we present the detailed decision problems of agents in the labor market.
4.1.1. Overview
As before, we adopt the Dixit-Stiglitz specication of goods production. A repre-
sentative, competitive nal good rm aggregates dierentiated intermediate goods
into a homogeneous nal good. Intermediate goods are supplied by monopolists,
who hire labor and capital services in competitive factor markets. The intermediate
good rms are assumed to be subject to the same Calvo price setting frictions as-
sumed in the previous section. The novelty in the present environment is that labor
services are supplied to the homogeneous labor market by ‘employment agencies’.
An alternative (perhaps more natural) formulation would be for the intermediate
good rms to do their own employment search. We instead separate the task of
nding workers from production of intermediate goods in order to avoid adding a
state variable to the intermediate good rm, which would complicate the solution of
their price-setting problem. As it is, the equilibrium conditions associated with the
behavior of intermediate good rms are unchanged from what they are elsewhere in
this paper.
Each employment agency retains a large number of workers. At the beginning
of the period, some workers are randomly selected to separate from the rm and go
into unemployment. Also, a number of new workers arrive from unemployment in
proportion to the number of vacancies posted by the rm in the previous period.
After separation and new arrivals occur, the nominal wage rate is set.
The nominal wage paid to an individual worker is determined by Nash bargaining,
which occurs once every Q periods. Each agency is permanently allocated to one of36
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Q dierent cohorts. Cohorts are dierentiated according to the period in which they
renegotiate their wage. Since there is an equal number of agencies in each cohort,
1@Q of the agencies bargain in each period. Agencies in cohorts that do not bargain
in the current period simply apply the wage implied for that period by the outcome
of the most recent bargaining round.
Once a wage rate is determined - whether by Nash bargaining or not - we assume
that each matched worker-rm pair nds it optimal to proceed with the relation-
ship in that period. In our calculations, we verify that this assumption is correct,
by conrming that the wage rate in each worker-agency relationship lies inside the
bargaining set associated with that relationship.
Next, the intensity of labor eort is determined according to a particular e!ciency
criterion. To explain this, we discuss the implications of increased intensity for the
worker and for the employment agency. The utility function of the household in the










Ow}> > $A 0> (4.1)
where Ow is the fraction of members of the household that are working and #w is the
intensity with with each worker works. As in GST, we follow the family household
construct of Merz (1995) in supposing that each household has a large number of
workers. Although the individual worker’s labor market experience - whether em-
ployed or unemployed - is determined in part by idiosyncratic shocks, the household
has su!ciently many workers that the total fraction of workers employed, Ow> as well
as the fractions allocated among the dierent cohorts, ol
w>l=0 >===>Q  1> is the
same for each household. We suppose that all the household’s workers are supplied
inelastically to the labor market. Each worker passes randomly from employment
with a particular agency to unemployment and back to employment according to37
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exogenous probabilities described below. The household’s budget constraint is:



















w is the nominal wage rate earned by workers in cohort l =0 >===>Q 1= The
index, l> indicates the number of periods in the past when bargaining occurred most
recently. Note that we implicitly assume that labor intensity is the same in each em-
ployment agency, regardless of cohort. This is explained below. The presence of the
term involving ex indicates the assumption that unemployed workers receive a pay-
ment of ex}w nal goods. The marginal cost, in utility terms, to an individual worker
who increases labor intensity by one unit is #
O
w = This is converted to currency units
by dividing by the multiplier, w> on (4.2) in the Lagrangian representation of the
household’s problem.
Let the price of labor services, Zw> denote the marginal gain to the employment
agency that occurs when an individual worker raises labor intensity by one unit.
Because the employment agency is competitive in the supply of labor services, Zw
is taken as given and is the same for all agencies, regardless of which cohort it is in.







Labor intensity is the same for all cohorts because none of the variables in (4.3) is
indexed by cohort. When the wage rate is determined by Nash bargaining, it is taken
into account that labor intensity is determined according to (4.3).38
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4.1.2. Details of the Labor Market Model
Employment agencies in the lwk cohort which does not renegotiate its wage in period
w sets the period w wage, Zl>w> as in (3.9):
Zl>w =˜ z>w}Zl>w31> ˜ z>w  (w31)
z>2 ¯ 
13z>2> (4.4)









After wages are set, employment agencies in cohort l supply labor services, ol
w#w> into
competitive labor markets. In addition, they post vacancies to attract new workers
in the next period.
To understand how agencies bargain and how they make their employment de-
cisions, it is useful to consider I (o0
w>$ w)> the value function of the representative
employment agency in the cohort that negotiates its wage in the current period.8
The arguments of I are the agency’s workforce after beginning-of-period separa-
tions and new arrivals, o0
w> and an arbitrary value for the nominal wage rate, $w= To










































where #w is assumed to satisfy (4.3). Also, ˜ Zw+Q denotes the Nash bargaining wage
rate that will be negotiated when the agency next has an opportunity to do so. At
8The value function for rms in other cohorts is dened analogously, and appears in the appendix.39
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for l =0 >1>===>Q  1> with the understanding here and throughout that l = Q is to
be interpreted as l =0 = Here, {l
w is the period w hiring rate of an agency in cohort l.
Expression (4.7) is deterministic, re ecting the assumption that the agency employs










w+l>l =0 >1>===>Q  1>
denotes the cost, in units of the nal good, associated with a hiring rate, {l
w= We
include the state of technology, }w> which grows at deterministic gross rate, } A 1>
to assure that growth is balanced in steady state.










where M ($w) is not a function of o0
w= The function, M ($w)> is the surplus that a rm
bargaining in the current period enjoys from a match with an individual worker,
when the current wage is $w=
We now turn to the worker. The period w v a l u eo fb e i n gaw o r k e ri na na g e n c y














w+1 +( 1 )Xw+1]> (4.9)
for l =1 >===>Q1= Here,  is the probability of remaining with the rm in the next
period and Xw is the value of being unemployed in period w. The values, Y l
w and
Xw> pertain to the beginning of period w> after job separation and job nding has40
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occurred. For workers employed by agencies in cohort l =0 > the value function is
Y 0 ($w)> where $w is an arbitrary value for the current period wage rate,
Y










w+1 +( 1 )Xw+1]= (4.10)
The notation makes the dependence of Y 0 on $w explicit to simplify the discussion
of the Nash bargaining problem below.







w+1 +( 1 iw)Xw+1]> (4.11)
where iw is the probability that an unemployed worker will land a job in period w+1.
Also, Y {
w is the period w +1value function of a worker who nds a job, before is is



























is the probability of nding a job in an agency which was of type l in the previous
period, conditional on being a worker who nds a job in w=
Total job matches must also satisfy the following matching function:
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0 ($w)  Xw
¢ M ($w)
(13) > (4.17)
where Y 0 ($w)Xw is the match surplus enjoyed by a worker. We denote the solution
to this problem by ˜ Zw= Note that ˜ Zw takes into account that intensity will be chosen
according to (4.3) as well as (4.4).
The resource constraint in the model must be modied to accommodate resources
paid to unemployed workers and resources used up in posting vacancies:
Fw + Lw + e












w = \w> (4.18)
where \w is the quantity of nal goods, (3.1).
After scaling the variables that grow, the equilibrium conditions associated with
the labor market can be combined with the non-labor market conditions of the model
in the previous section to solve the overall model. For complete details about how
this economy is scaled to account for growth, and for the other equations, see the
Appendix.
4.2. Quantitative Results
In the rst subsection below, we report the parameterization of the model. In the
second subsection, we discuss some properties of the equilibrium of the alternative42
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labor market model. The results for boom-bust episodes are presented in the third
subsection.
4.2.1. Parameterization of Models
To accommodate the fact that the average duration of unemployment is a little over
two months, we adopt a bi-monthly time period for the model. For comparability
with the standard sticky wage model in the previous section, we study a bimonthly
version of that model too. The parameters that the two models have in common
were set as follows:
i =1 =20> z =1 =05> s =
5
6
> =0 =84> z =0 =13>  =1 =95> | =0 =18>
 =1 =01358
3(1@6)> } =1 =0136





Here, only s> > > } are adjusted relative to their values in the analysis of the
previous section (see (3.12)). The parameter, s> was set to imply a mean time
between price changes of one year.9 The inertia parameter in the monetary policy
rule, l> was set to 0.60 in our benchmark parameterization of the model with the
alternative labor market. We found that the degree of over reaction to a signal about
future productivity is sensitive to this parameter, with a smaller value making the
over-reaction large.
Regarding the parameters that apply specically to our standard sticky wage
model, we set z =0 =87> which implies that wages remain unchanged on average for
9We preferred to set s to a lower value. However, when we tried we encountered numerical
problems in computing the Ramsey equilibrium for the alternative labor market model. We hope
to solve this numerical problem for the next draft.43
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7.89 bi-monthly periods, or 1.3 years. The values of #O and O were set as before,
as specied in (2.8).
Now consider the parameters that apply specically to the alternative labor mar-
ket model. The disutility of work intensity parameter, > was set so as to imply a
value for labor intensity equal to unity in steady state, # =1 = In addition, we follow
GT in setting the hiring rate adjustment cost parameter, > so that the steady state
value of the job nding rate, i> implies that jobs last on average 2.22 months, or
1.11 model periods (i.e., i =0 =9)= We also follow GT in our setting of the bargaining
power parameter, > the elasticity of matches to unemployment, > the degree of
convexity in the disutility from work intensity, O> and the constant term, p> in the
matching function:
e
x =0 =3> =0 =9333>=
1
2
> p =0 =1>=
1
2
> O =1 3 =5> =5 4 =42=
Following GT, the value for  is chosen to imply that jobs on average last about
2.5 years. Finally, we must select a value for Q> t h el e n g t ho ft i m eb e t w e e nw a g e
negotiations. Following Dixon and Kara (2006) we set Q =1 5so that the average
age of existing wage contracts in the alternative labor market model is equal to
the average age (i.e., 7.89 periods) of existing contracts in the standard sticky price
model.10
4.2.2. Properties of the Alternative Labor Market Model
Before evaluating the model’s implications for boom-bust episodes, we display some
of its basic steady state and dynamic properties. For the dynamic properties, we nd
that money has bigger real eects in the standard sticky wage model than it does in
10Dixon and Kara (2006) report that the average age of a wage contract when there is staggering
as in Taylor is (Q +1 ) @2=44
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the alternative labor market model. The dynamic response to a technology shock is
similar across the two models.







=1 9 =51> ¯ e 
ex





2 (1  )
2 O
F + L
=0 =026>z ˜ z =3 =0>z=0 =43> z
0 =3 =27> z
14 =6 =97>O =0 =93=
where absence of a time subscript indicates the steady state value of the variable.
The product, z ˜ z> is the steady state value of the real wage paid by employment
agencies to workers, scaled by }w> and } is the steady state value of wSw}w> where
w is the multiplier on the household’s budget constraint. The object, ¯ e> is the ratio
of the  ow value of unemployment to the  ow value of employment for a worker.
This ratio has attracted much attention, particularly with Hagedorn and Minovskii
(2006)’s demonstration that a higher value of ¯ e increases the volatility of labor market
variables. Our setting for this ratio is quite small (it corresponds to the value esti-
mated by GST). For example, Shimer (2005a) argues that an empirically plausible
value for ¯ e lies in the neighborhood of 0.4. The consumption to GDP ( F+L)r a t i o
for the model is in line with standard estimates for the US, and the capital-output
ratio corresponds roughly to the familiar US (annualized) value of 3. Our ratio of
recruitment costs to GDP of 2.6 percent is somewhat larger than the value of 0.01
The steady state unemployment rate in the model, 1  0=93 = 0=07, corresponds to
the value used in GT. Our steady state unemployment rate is somewhat high if we
compare it with measured unemployment. However, the concept of unemployment
in the model is broader and includes all (working age) people not working.
The object, z> i st h er e a lw a g e( s c a l e db y}w) that makes a worker indierent45
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between employment (i.e., matching with an agency and staying with it until ex-
ogenously separated) and unemployment. The object, zl> is the scaled real wage
that makes an employment agency that last renegotiated its wage l periods ago just
indierent between matching with a worker and not matching (see Appendix B for
details). The latter object is a function of l because it is calculated under the as-
sumption that when the next renegotiation takes place, the rm reverts to the scaled
steady state real wage, z ˜ z= Our dynamic calculations assume that the real wage paid





>l=0 >===>Q 1> for all w= Note from (4.19)
that this is the case in steady state. This is also true for the dynamic simulations
reported in the paper. The low value of z re ects the relatively low value of ¯ e used
in the model.11
Turning to the model’s dynamic properties, we consider the dynamic eects of a
monetary policy shock, xw (see (3.10) and (3.11)) and of a (conventional) technology
shock, w (see (2.7)). Consider Figure 16 rst. It displays dynamic responses to the
same monetary policy shock in each of the bimonthly version of our standard sticky
wage model and the alternative labor market model. The response of the equilibrium
interest rate appears in the 2,5 panel of the gure. This response is slightly dierent
between the two models because, according to (3.11), the equilibrium interest rate
responds to output and expected in ation, as well as to a monetary policy shock.
Note that the real eects of monetary policy are substantially larger than in the
standard sticky wage model. For example, the percent response of GDP is three
times larger in the latter model than it is in the alternative labor market model.
Similarly, the response of in ation in the alternative labor market model is larger.
The gure allows us to trace the economics of the monetary transmission mechanism
11We attempted to raise ¯ e by increasing ex= However, when we did so we ran into numerical
di!culties computing the Ramsey equilibria for our model. We are working to xt h i s .46
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in the alternative labor market model. Thus, note how the real price of labor (that
is, Zw@Sw> the real wage paid for a unit of homogeneous labor by intermediate good
rms to employment agencies) jumps in response to an expansionary monetary policy
shock. This jump re ects that the demand for labor rises as the demand for goods
rises in response to the expansionary monetary policy shock. Employment agencies
respond by posting higher vacancies and this leads, in subsequent periods, to an
expansion in the number of people employed (see ‘labor’). The posting of vacancies
is further encouraged by the fact that the average, across rm cohorts, of the real
wage paid to workers falls. This fall re ects the rise in in ation and the wage-setting
frictions. The intensity of work eort rises in response to the rise in the price of
labor because intensity is set e!ciently (see (4.3)). The product of intensity and
labor corresponds to hours worked. Note that the response of hours worked in the
alternative labor supply model is smaller than the response in the sticky wage model.
F i n a l l y ,ar e s u l tt h a tp l a y sa ni m p o r t a n tr o l ei nb o o m - b u s td y n a m i c si st h a tt h ep r i c e
of capital rises in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock. The eect is
roughly the same in the two models.
We investigated the possibility that the weaker eect of monetary policy shocks
in the alternative labor market model re ects our low value of ¯ e= To investigate this,
we set ex =2 >12 which implies ¯ e =0 =70 (a value suggested by Hall). The peak
output eect of a monetary policy shock rises from a little over 0.01 percent in the
low ¯ e model (see Figure 16) to a little under 0.015 in the high ¯ e economy. Although
the change in the value of ex has the expected qualitative eect, it does essentially
nothing to close the quantitative gap in the output response of the alternative labor
market and standard sticky wage economies.
12Given that we hold i constant, this implies  =2 0 =92=47
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Now consider Figure 17, which displays the response of the two models to a stan-
dard technology shock, w.T h egure displays the response of the two models, when
monetary policy is specied as in (3.10) and (3.11), as well as when it is specied
optimally (the computation of the Ramsey equilibrium is explained in Appendix C).
Consider the Ramsey equilibrium responses, which are quite similar, rst. The re-
sponses of output, hours worked, and in ation are essentially the same. The initial
response of hours worked in the Ramsey equilibrium is negative, and turns positive
afterward. The composition of output diers between the two models, with consump-
tion rising relatively more strongly in the alternative labor market model. In both
models, the nominal rate of interest is reduced sharply in the wake of a technology
shock. The interest rate is reduced by more in the alternative labor market model,
presumably to compensate for the weaker monetary non-neutrality in that model,
which was documented in Figure 16. Note how the interest rate cuts are so large
that the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate is violated. Strictly speaking,
these are not equilibria. We report them nevertheless, as evidence on the properties
of the models.
The responses of output and employment to a technology shock when monetary
policy is described by (3.10) and (3.11) are similar in the two models, though weaker
than in the Ramsey equilibria. The weaker responses presumably re ect that mon-
etary policy is less expansionary in the wake of a technology shock than it is in the
Ramsey equilibria. Note how the interest rate falls less in the equilibrium than in the
Ramsey responses. As in the Ramsey equilibrium, consumption responds relatively
strongly in the alternative labor market model. A big dierence in the two models
lies in the in ation rate, which falls more in the alternative labor market model.
The gures allow us to trace the economics of the transmission of a technology
shock in the alternative labor market model. Note how the price of labor falls sharply48
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in the equilibrium of this model. This fall re ects the inadequacy of aggregate de-
mand in the wake of a technology shock. As a result, there is a persistent decline
in the demand for labor by intermediate good rms. Employment agencies react
by reducing vacancies. At the same time, the real wage soars because of the wage
frictions and the drop in in ation. This provides an additional incentive for employ-
ment agencies to reduce vacancies. The result is a persistent decline in employment.
The intensity of work eort falls because of the drop in the price of labor, and the
combined eects result in a persistent drop in total hours worked. It is interesting
that the drop is similar across the two models, even though the rise in the real wage
in the standard sticky wage model is substantially smaller than what it is in the
alternative labor market model.
4.2.3. Results for Boom-Bust
The results in Figure 18 show the dynamic response of our models to a w shock that
occurs in period 1> followed by %w+s = w for s =1 2 = Thus, there is a signal that
technology will improve two years in the future, a signal that in the end turns out to
be false. The gure displays the responses of the variables in our alternative labor
market and standard sticky wage models. In each case, we display the responses for
the version of the model in which policy is governed by (3.10) and (3.11), as well as
for the version in which policy is optimal. Note that the Ramsey equilibria for the
two models are for the most part very similar (compare the circles and the stars).
Interestingly, in both models the Ramsey equilibria are characterized by a rise in the
real wage and a fall in the price of capital. Although the behavior of these variables
is qualitatively similar, there are clearly important quantitative dierences. At the
same time, the ‘real wage’ in the two models clearly refers to at least slightly dierent49
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concepts and so comparisons of the real wage must be made with caution.
Now consider the equilibria in which policy is governed by (3.10) and (3.11).
Our earlier result that output overreacts to a signal shock in the standard sticky
wage model is reproduced in the bimonthly version of that model. The percent
increase in output, at its peak, is over three times the corresponding Ramsey increase.
The alternative labor market model also exhibits over reaction, though one that is
quantitatively smaller. In the equilibrium, the percent increase in output at its peak
is 0=85 percent, versus 0=47 percent in the Ramsey equilibrium. There is a similar
overreaction in hours worked. In both models, the real wage is low in the boom phase,
consistent with our diagnosis that a key problem is the failure of the equilibrium to
reproduce the rise in the real wage that occurs in the Ramsey equilibrium. In the
alternative labor market model, the fall in the real wage combines with a rise in the
price of capital to create an incentive to increase the hiring rate. This leads to a
rise in employment. In addition, the increased demand for goods leads to a rise in
the demand for labor, which produces a rise in the price of labor. This provides
additional incentive to increase the hiring rate and its leads to an increase in the
intensity of work.
Recall that in the sticky wage model, there are two crucial reasons that output
over reacts to a signal about future technology: sticky wages and in ation targeting.
To investigate the role of in ation targeting, we redid the computations setting  =
1=01= As before, the overreaction does not occur with this change. In fact, output,
consumption and investment actually under react - these variables rise less than they
do in the Ramsey equilibrium. We also redid the calculations with  exible wages by
supposing that Nash bargaining occurs in each period in each agency. We found
that responses are reduced, and more nearly resemble the responses in the Ramsey
equilibrium. For example, at its peak output rises by 0.50 percent, versus 0.47 in the50
ECB
Working Paper Series No 955
October 2008
Ramsey equilibrium. Similarly, at their peaks investment, consumption and hours
worked rise 0=88> 0.34 and 0=47 percent, respectively. The corresponding Ramsey
gures are 0=98, 0=23 and 0=45 percent.13
In sum, the overreaction to an anticipated technology shock that is so pronounced
in our sticky wage model is also a feature of the alternative labor market model.
However, the quantitative eects are smaller. As discussed above, our model of
boom-bust is driven by two things: a technology shock that is never realized and
a monetary policy response. The alternative labor market model exhibits a similar
dynamic response to technology shocks as our standard sticky wage model. However,
the real eects of monetary policy shocks are weaker in the alternative labor market
model, and this is the reason the boom-bust in the alternative labor market model is
quantitatively weaker. This suggests that factors which enhance the nonneutrality of
money in the alternative labor market model would result in a quantitatively larger
boom-bust cycle.
5. Full Monetary Model
We consider the full monetary model of Christiano, Motto and Rostagno(2006).
That model introduces into the simple monetary model of section 3 a banking sec-
tor following Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1995) and the nancial frictions
in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). In the model, there are two nancing
requirements: (i) intermediate good rms require funding in order to pay wages and
capital rental costs and (ii) the capital is owned and rented out by entrepreneurs,
who do not have enough wealth (‘net worth’) on their own to acquire the capital
13The peaks in output, consumption and hours worked occur in period 12, while it occurs in
period 11 for investment.51
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stock and so they must borrow. The working capital lending in (i) is nanced by
demand deposits issued by banks to households. The lending in (ii) is nanced by
savings deposits and time deposits issued to households. Demand deposits and sav-
ings deposits pay interest, but relatively little, because they generate utility services
to households. Following Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1995), the provision
of demand and savings deposits by banks requires that they use capital and labor
resources, as well as reserves. Time deposits do not generate utility services. In ad-
dition to holding demand, savings and time deposits, households also hold currency
because they generate utility services. Our measure of M1 in the model is the sum
of currency plus demand deposits. Our broader measure of money (we could call
it M2 or M3) is the sum of M1 and savings deposits. Total credit is the sum of
the lending done in (i) and (ii). Credit diers from money in that it includes time
deposits and does not include currency. Finally, the monetary base in the model is
the sum of currency plus bank reserves. A key feature of the model that allows it to
make contact with the literature on boom-busts is that it includes various monetary
aggregates as well as credit, and that their are nontrivial dierences between these
aggregates.
Figure 19 displays the response of the full model to the signal shock, and includes
the response of the simple model for ease of comparison. Note that the full model
displays a weaker response, though qualitatively the results are similar. Figure 20
displays the response of various nancial variables to the signal shock. The top left
gure shows that the monetary base grows throughout the boom, and then falls in the
period it is realized that the shock will not happen. M1 growth is strong throughout
the expansion, while M3 growth falls consistently throughout the boom. Thus, the
behavior of the monetary aggregates is inconsistent. However, credit growth is strong
throughout the boom and remains high during the bust. That credit growth is con-52
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sistently strong throughout the boom-bust episode while monetary aggregates send
con icting signals re ects portfolio shifts among the monetary aggregates. Moreover,
as noted above, not all the expansion in credit shows up in the monetary aggregates.
Figure 21 shows what happens when we include credit growth in the policy rule,
(3.11), with a coe!cient of 3= The strong growth of credit leads to a tightening of
monetary policy during the boom, and causes the boom to more nearly resemble the
e!cient response of the economy to the signal about future productivity.
In sum, we have simulated the response to a signal shock of a model with consid-
erably more frictions than those in our simple monetary model. The basic qualitative
ndings of our simple model are robust to this added complexity.
6. Conclusions
Wage setting frictions deserve to be taken seriously because they are a feature of
models that t the data well. It is known that with sticky wages, a policy of targeting
in ation can lead to suboptimal results by making the real wage overly rigid. For
example, if there is a negative oil shock which requires that the real wage fall, a
policy of preventing the price level from rising will cause the real wage to be too
high and employment too low. In this paper we have shown that the type of boom-
bust episodes we have observed may be another example of the type of suboptimal
outcome that can occur in an economy with sticky wages and monetary targeting.
Indeed, we argued that within the current class of DSGE models that have been t
to data, it is hard to nd another way to account for boom-bust episodes.
We have not addressed the factors that make in ation targeting attractive. These
are principally the advantages that in ation targeting has for anchoring in ation
expectations. We are sympathetic to the view that these advantages argue in favor53
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of some sort of in ation-targeting in monetary policy. However, our results suggest
that it may be optimal to mitigate some of the negative consequences of in ation
targeting by also taking into account other variables. In particular, we have examined
the possibility that a policy which reacts to credit growth in addition to in ation may
reduce the likelihood that monetary policy inadvertently contributes to boom-bust
episodes.
Our argument remains tentative, even within the connes of the monetary economies
that we studied in this paper. We only showed that a monetary policy which feeds
back onto credit growth moves the response of the economy to a certain signal shock
closer to the optimal response. Such a policy would substantially reduce the vio-
lence of boom-bust episodes. However, a nal assessment of the value of integrating
credit growth into monetary policy awaits an examination of how the response of
the economy to other shocks is aected. This work is currently under way. The
model of Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2006) is ideally suited for this. Not only
does it contain a variety of credit measures, so that a serious consideration of the
consequences of integrating credit into monetary policy is possible. In addition, that
model is estimated with many shocks, making it possible to see how integrating credit
growth into monetary policy aects the transmission of shocks.54
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A. Appendix A: The Equations Characterizing Equilibrium
in the Simple Monetary Model
Our simple monetary model is quite standard and the derivation of the equilibrium
conditions can be found in several places (see, especially, Yun (1996) and Erceg,
Henderson, and Levin (2000)). For the sake of completeness, we list the equations
of the model here. To dene the seven equations that characterize price and wage
optimization, we must dene several auxiliary variables, sW
w>z W
w>I s>w>I z>w>z W
w= The
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To characterize the cross-sectional average utility of households, we require an addi-
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The fact that real marginal cost, vw> is the real wage divided by the marginal pro-
















z31 kw> is required to convert household average work, kw> into eective
average labor eort. Also, nw denotes the capital stock, scaled by }w31= A similar
adjustment is required to dene an aggregate resource constraint:




















The capital accumulation equation is:















w h e r ew ei n t e r p r e tLw as investment scaled by }w=




}>w+1 (1 + Uw)  }>w} =0 > (A.11)











Here, }>w has been scaled by multiplying by }w= The period w rst order condition
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The appearance of zW
w@z
+
w re ects that household labor eort varies across the popu-




w provides the necessary adjustment. When O =0then utility is
linear in hours and no adjustment is required. Accordingly, in this case (A.6) and




The 15 endogenous variables to be determined are:
w>f w>k w>n w+1>s
W




w>I z>w> ˜ zw> }>w>L w>t w=
We have listed 14 equations above, (A.1)-(A.14). When the equations are augmented
by a monetary policy rule, then we can solve for our 15 endogenous variables. This
corresponds to what we call our simple monetary model. Alternatively, the 14 equa-
tions can be augmented by the rst order conditions associated with the Lagrangian
representation of the Ramsey problem. The paper discusses the dynamic proper-
ties of the resulting Ramsey equilibrium. Technical notes related to this appear in
Appendix C.
B. Appendix B: Equilibrium with Alternative Labor Market
This section displays the equilibrium conditions used to solve the version of the model
with Gertler-Trigari labor markets. It then provides formulas for the steady state.58
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B.1. Equilibrium Conditions Needed to Solve the Model
To dene M in (4.8), it is convenient to rst denote the growth rate of employment





































































for l =0 >1>===Q  2= Similarly, optimality for the hiring decision of a rm that is in





















Note the familiar result here, that the value of the increase in period w+1employment
(i.e., the expression on the right side of the equality in (B.2) and (B.3)) resulting
from an increase in period w hiring is captured by a function of the hiring decision in
w +1 .
The derivative of M with respect to $w> evaluated at ˜ Zw> is, after taking into
account the envelope conditions associated with {l
w+l>59
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where Mz>w denotes the derivative of M ($w) evaluated at $w = ˜ Zw=
It is easily veried that the marginal value to the worker of the wage is:








where Yz>w denotes the derivative of Y 0 ($w) in (4.10) with respect to $w> evaluated at
$w = ˜ Zw= The dierence in the way the agency and the worker discount future wages
re ects their asymmetric positions. Both take into account the way the wage contract
evolves over time, with Kw>m= However, the worker includes  in the discounting, to
take into account the fact that it could separate. The rm is bound to the contract
for all periods of the contract, and so  does not enter its discounting. However,
the number of workers covered by the contract will change over time as new workers
arrive and old workers separate. This factor is accounted for by the presence of lw>m=
The rst order necessary condition associated with the Nash bargaining problem,
(4.17) is:







where Mw and Y 0
w denote M ($w) and Y 0 ($w) evaluated at $w = ˜ Zw=
Before the preceding equations can be used to solve the model, they must be




> }ww+1 = w+1}w+1Sw+1>z w =
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The following relations, which make use of (4.5), are useful:
Kw>m ˜ Zw
Sw+m}w+m









˜ Zw3l = Jw3l>l+1zw3l ˜ zw3l
Kw3l>l ˜ Zw3l
Sw}w
= Jw3l>lzw3l ˜ zw3l=





































































for l =0 >===>Q  1= Here, the weight in front of zw3l ˜ zw3l is understood to be unity,
when l =0 = The condition for Mz>w> in terms of scaled variables, is:
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}>w+1 +( 1 iw)X}>w+1]= (B.12)
















The condition for e!cient intensity becomes:















































for l =0 >===>Q  1= The expression for Yz>w becomes:
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Finally, the Nash Bargaining condition becomes:






Mz>w =0 = (B.22)







}>w>p w>y w>z w> ˜ zw>X }w>o
l
w>i w> }>w>k w>w>#w>O w= (B.23)
Regarding the equilibrium conditions associated with the rest of the model, we
drop the equations in Appendix A which pertain to wage setting, i.e., (A.4), (A.5),
(A.6), (A.7). The 8 variables in that section, that are not listed in (B.23) are:
s
W
w>I s>w>n w>v w>f w>L w>U w>t w=
The 11 equations that remain are (A.1), (A.2), (A.3), (A.8), (A.10), (A.11), (A.12),
(A.13), (A.14), (3.11) with zW
w  1 and





























Thus, we have 23 + 3Q equations in 23 + 3Q unknowns.
B.2. Equilibrium Conditions on the Bargaining Set
In the previous section we assumed that agencies and individual workers only separate








paid by an employment agency which has renegotiated most recently l periods in the






>l=0 >1>===>Q1= Here, zl
w has the
property that if zl
w A zl
w then the agency prefers not to employ the worker and zl
w63
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has the property that if zl
w ?z l
w then the worker prefers to be unemployed. We now
describe our strategy for computing zl
w and zl
w=
The lower bound, zl














}>w+1 +( 1 )X}>w+1]>
for l =0 >===>Q  1= In steady state, this is




 [Y} +( 1 )X}]>
where a variable without time subscript denotes its steady state value. We now
consider the upper bound, zl
w> which sets the surplus of an agency in cohort l to























































which is a monotonically increasing function of l=
For the dynamic economy, the additional unknowns are the 2Q variables com-
posed of zl
w and zl
w for l =0 >1>===>Q  1= We have an equal number of equations to
solve for them.64
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B.3. Steady State
Our strategy for computing the steady state replaces the job nding rate, i> as an
unknown, by . In addition, we impose that the steady state value of intensity is
# =1 > and we solve for the value of  that is consistent with this restriction.
B.3.1. Labor market equations
In steady state, ol
w = o
m
o for all l>m>w>o> so that
{ =1 > lw>m =1 =












The rst order conditions, (B.8) and (B.9) are all identical in steady state, and given
the value of { obtained above (as well as # =1 ) , they reduce to:




2 + (1  )]>
or,
z =1+(1  )
1




which gives z as a function of ˜ z=







Y} = z ˜ z  
1
(1 + O)}
+ [Y} +( 1 )X}]> (B.27)65
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where the l superscript on Y} has been dropped because all the equations in (B.10)
are the same, and so they have the same solution. Equation (B.13) implies:
Y
{





} +( 1 i)X}]= (B.29)
Equation (B.17) implies
O = k = Qo> (B.30)
so that equation (B.15) reduces to:
p =( 1 )k= (B.31)
Also,














The rst order condition associated with the Nash problem is:
YzM} +( 1 )[Y}  X}]Mz =0 > (B.33)













































˜ z =¯ =











The resource constraint in steady state is:





















by the condition that prots are zero in steady state. That is prots in steady state
are, before scaling:
Sw\w  Swvw (\w + !}w)=
Dividing by Sw}w> we obtain in steady state:
(i  1)\} = !>
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The adjustment for the investment equation is:
t =1 =
B.5. Steady State Solution
As noted above, we treat i as known and we set # =1(so that k = O)= These two
restrictions allows us to solve for  and = The value of  is found by a non-linear,
one-dimensional search. Fix an arbitrary value of = First compute Mz>Y z>Uand {
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Use (B.26) compute z and use (B.25) to compute M}. Then use (B.27), (B.28)
and (B.29) to solve for Y {




z ˜ z   1





1   (1  i)
+
i
1   (1  i)
z ˜ z   1

















Equation (B.36) can be used to solve for X} a n dt h e n( ??)i ss o l v e do rY}= Combining
(B.31) and (B.32) we obtain the steady state level of employment:




Then, (B.31) and (B.30) are solved for p and o= Given k> Is>n , f> } and L can be
computed. For Is> the steady state zero-prot condition must be applied. Adjust 
until (B.33) is satised.69
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C .A p p e n d i xC :R a m s e y - O p t i m a lP o l i c y
We nd the Ramsey-optimal allocations for our economy using the computer code
and strategy used in Levin, Lopez-Salido, (2004) and Levin, Onatski, Williams and
Williams (2005). For completeness, we brie y describe this strategy below. Let {w
denote a set of Q endogenous variables in a dynamic economic model. (According
to Appendix D> in our simple monetary model, Q =1 5 =) Let the private sector


















for all w and all vw= Here, vw denotes a history:
v
w =( v0>v 1>===>vw)>









so that (vw+1)@(vw) is the probability of history vw+1> conditional on vw=



















In our simple monetary model, X is given by (A.15). The Ramsey problem is to
maximize preferences by choice of {(vw) for each vw> subject to (C.1). We express the
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where (vw) is the row vector of multipliers on the equilibrium conditions. Consider
a particular history, vw =( vw31>v w)> with wA0= The rst order necessary condition



























































after dividing by (vw)
w= In less notationally-intensive notation,
X1 ({w>v w)+wHwi1 ({w>{ w+1>v w>v w+1)+
31w31i2 ({w31>{ w>v w31>v w)=0 =
The rst order necessary condition for optimality at w =0is (C.3) with 31  0= The
time-consistency problem occurs when the multipliers associated with the Ramsey
problem are non-zero after date 0. Following the Ramsey equilibrium in such a future
w requires respecting w31.H o w e v e r ,i fw31 6=0 > then utility can be increased at w by
restarting the Ramsey problem with w31 =0 = When we study Ramsey allocations,
we assume there is a commitment technology that prevents the authorities from
acting on this incentive to deviate from the Ramsey plan.
The equations that characterize the Ramsey equilibrium are the Q 1 equations,
(C.1), and the Q equations (C.3). The unknowns are the Q elements of { and
the Q  1 multipliers, = The equations, (C.3) are computed symbolically using the
software prepared for Levin, Lopez-Salido, (2004) and Levin, Onatski, Williams and
Williams (2005). The resulting system of equations is then solved by perturbation
around steady state using the software package, Dynare.
To apply the perturbation method, we require the nonstochastic steady state
value of {. We compute this in two steps. First, xo n eo ft h ee l e m e n t so f{> say the
in ation rate, = We then solve for the remaining Q1 elements of { by imposing the71
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Q 1 equations, (C.1). In the next step we compute the Q 1 vector of multipliers







where a function without an explicit argument is understood to mean it is evaluated











so that \ is an Q × 1 column vector, [ is an Q × (Q  1) matrix and  is an





x = \  [=
Note that this regression will not in general t perfectly, because there are Q  1
‘explanatory variables’ and Q elements of \ to ‘explain’. We vary the value of 
until max |xl| =0 = This completes the discussion of the calculation of the steady
state and of the algorithm for computing Ramsey allocations.
14This step is potentially very cumbersome, but has been made relatively easy by the software
produced for Levin, Lopez-Salido, (2004) and Levin, Onatski, Williams and Williams (2005). This
s o f w a r ee n d o g e n o u s l yw r i t e st h ec o d en e c e s s a r yt os o l v ef o rt h em u l t i p l i e r s .72
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Figure 1: S&P500 Divided by CPI (Shiller)77
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Riskfree rate with payoff in t+1 (annual)
Figure
3: Real Business Cycle Model with Habit and CEE Investment Adjustment Costs
                                 Baseline - Tech Shock Not Realized, Perturbation - Tech Shock Realized in Period




































































































































Riskfree rate with payoff in t+1 (annual)
Figure
4: Real Business Cycle Model without Habit and with CEE Investment Adjustment Costs







































































































































Riskfree rate with payoff in t+1 (annual)
Figure
5: Real Business Cycle Model with Habit and Without Investment Adjustment Costs



































































































































Riskfree rate with payoff in t+1 (annual)
Figure
6: Real Business Cycle Model with Habit and with Level Investment Adjustment Costs





































































































































 Figure 7: Real Business Cycle Model with Habit Persistence and Flow Adjustment Costs













































































































































































Figure 8: RBC and Simple Monetary Model




















Note: subscript on nominal rate of interest indicates date of payoff. R
t+1
e
 is graphed at date t. 
S
t
 indicates gross change in price level from t-1 to t.84
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Response of Simple Monetary Model and Perturbed Model to Signal Shock




































Note: subscript on nominal rate of interest indicates date of payoff. R
t+1
e
 is graphed at date t. 
S
t
 indicates gross change in price level from t-1 to t.
Figure  10: 86
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Note: subscript on nominal rate of interest indicates date of payoff. R
t+1
e
 is graphed at date t. 
S
t
 indicates gross change in price level from t-1 to t.
Figure 11: 87
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Note: subscript on nominal rate of interest indicates date of payoff. R
t+1
e
 is graphed at date t. 
S
t
 indicates gross change in price level from t-1 to t.
Figure  12:88
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 Response of Simple Monetary Model and Perturbed Model to Signal Shock








































































Alternative Labor Market Model






























































































































































































































































































































































Figure 15: Response to a monetary policy shock91
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Equilibrium, Alternative Labor Market Model
Ramsey, Alternative Labor Market Model
Equilibrium, Bimonthly Version of Simple Monetary Model


























































































































































































































































































































































Figure 16: Response to a contemporaneous positive technology shock92
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Equilibrium, Alternative Labor Market Model
Ramsey, Alternative Labor Market Model
Equilibrium, Bimonthly Version of Simple Monetary Model






























































































































































































































































































































































Figure 17: Response to a signal (not realized) of future technology shock93
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Figure 18: Response of Full and Simple Monetary Model to Signal Shock94
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Figure 19: Behavior of Money, Credit and Net Worth in Full Monetary Model95
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Figure 20: Response of Full Monetary Model and Perturbed Model to Signal Shock96
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